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ABSTRACT
Testing the Efficacy of Interventions to Decrease Racial Bias in Jury Selection
By
Karima Modjadidi
Advisor: Margaret Kovera
Despite legal restrictions, attorneys continue to use peremptory challenges to strike minorities
from juries (Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Equal Justice Initiative, 2010;
Gabbidon, Kowal, Jordan, Roberts, & Vincenzi, 2008). The current protection against racially
motivated peremptory challenges provided by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) has not been effective
in reducing racial discrimination during voir dire and social scientists have yet to identify a
suitable procedure for reducing the bias. The present research examined if methods used in
reducing discrimination in industrial and organizational psychology can have a similar impact in
a legal setting. Participants viewed venirepersons who varied in race, attitude and gender.
Participants rated how likely it would be for them to use a peremptory challenge on each
venireperson and then chose two to exclude at the end. Venireperson attitude was the only
significant predictor of likelihood ratings and exclusion. Several possibilities are explored to
explain why the research did not replicate previous studies or archival data.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Racial bias remains in the justice system despite legal interventions intended to remedy
the problem. For example, minority defendants are convicted more frequently and receive longer
sentences (Mustard, 2001; Williams, Demuth, & Holcomb, 2007). One possible reason for the
large disparities in convictions is that Black individuals are vastly underrepresented on jury
panels (Baldus et al., 2001; Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Equal Justice
Initiative, 2010; Gabbidon, Kowal, Jordan, Roberts, & Vincenzi, 2008). Discrimination against
Black defendants by White jurors not only leads to more guilty verdicts but also to a greater
likelihood that Black defendants will be sentenced to death (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, &
Gaertner, 1997; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Lynch & Haney, 2000;
Schuller, Kazoleas, & Kawakami, 2009). The disparity between Black and White individuals on
a jury is not accidental and can be partly attributed to how attorneys select jurors.
During voir dire, attorneys have two methods to remove potential jurors from a jury. The
first method is a challenge for cause. An attorney can ask the judge to remove a venireperson if
it appears that the juror is biased towards their client or cannot be fair and impartial. Challenges
for cause are unlimited but attorneys must provide a justification for the challenge and the judge
must agree that there is cause to excuse the potential juror. The second method available to
attorneys is a limited number of peremptory challenges. Attorneys do not need to provide any
reasoning for their decision but they may not excuse a juror based on race or gender (Batson v.
Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 1994; Powers v. Ohio, 1991). Despite these prohibitions,
attorneys continue to make race-based peremptory challenges without much interference from
the courts.
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One reason attorneys are still able to dismiss jurors based on their race is because the
legal protection provided by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) is inadequate. If opposing counsel is
suspicious that peremptory challenges are being used to eliminate venirepersons because of their
race, they can raise a Batson challenge. Then, the attorney needs to provide a race neutral
justification for the challenge. However, it is not difficult for attorneys to generate acceptable
race neutral explanations; in fact, the explanations do not need to be “persuasive or even
plausible” (Purkett v. Elem, 1995, p. 768). Therefore, it is unsurprising that in one field study
judges accepted around 80% of race-neutral explanations provided by attorneys and only 17% of
Batson challenges involving a Black venireperson were successful (Melilli, 1996). In North
Carolina, although non-racial variables influenced peremptory challenges, none were as closely
related to the likelihood of dismissal as were race (Grosso & O’Brien, 2012). Because current
preventative measures such as the Batson challenge are rarely successful in diversifying a jury
(Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Melilli, 1996), it is time to look at other procedural remedies to
effectively reduce discrimination.
Certainly, concerns about eliminating discrimination are present in legal contexts other
than jury selection. In particular, social science research has been useful in providing insights
into successful practices for minimizing discrimination in employment contexts. Just as it is
illegal to remove venirepersons from the jury pool because of their race (Batson v. Kentucky,
1986) and gender (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 1994), it is illegal for employers to make hiring or
promotion decisions based on race, gender, or religion (Civil Rights Act, 1964; Civil Rights Act,
1991). One intervention that has been promising for reducing discrimination in hiring decisions
is increasing the accountability of decision makers. The likelihood that individuals will make a
decision based on stereotypes decreases when they know beforehand they will be held
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accountable for their decision (Ford, Gambino, Lee, Mayo, & Ferguson, 2004; Nadler, Lowery,
Grebinoski, & Jones, 2014). The present research is designed to investigate if accountability can
reduce biased decision-making in jury selection as it has in lab studies of employment decisions.
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Chapter 2: Background on Race in Peremptory Challenges
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of all White juries in Strauder v. West Virginia
(1880). Strauder was a Black man convicted of murder by an all-White jury. He appealed his
conviction arguing that the West Virginia statute excluding Black individuals from serving on
any jury violated his 14th Amendment rights. He further argued that because Blacks were not
eligible to serve on a jury he was not tried by a jury of his peers in the same manner that a White
defendant would be. This differential treatment was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in
the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that discriminating against Blacks
during jury selection because of their race was unconstitutional. Thus, the Court set precedent
that Black citizens could serve on juries.
The Strauder decision focused on Blacks being eligible for jury service but did not
address whether it was permissible for attorneys to dismiss them from a jury after voir dire at
different rates than White jurors or the burden of proof required by the defense to claim racial
discrimination. It was not until nearly a century later that the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges (Swain v. Alabama,
1965). In Swain, the petitioner was a Black man convicted of rape and sentenced to death. He
appealed arguing that his 14th Amendment rights were violated because the prosecution used
peremptory challenges to remove all six eligible Black venirepersons leaving him with an allWhite jury. The Supreme Court ruled that using peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude
Black venirepersons was unconstitutional but that the Swain failed to show a systematic use of
peremptory challenges against Black venirepersons over time. Therefore, the Court established
that defendants must show that State excluded Black venirepersons from the jury in their specific
case and must establish evidence of repeated discrimination in other cases.
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Batson v. Kentucky (1986) revisited the burden of proof established in Swain. Batson, a
Black male, was charged with burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During voir dire, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to dismiss the four Black venirepersons. Batson
appealed his conviction on the grounds that his 6th (right to an impartial jury) and 14th
Amendment rights were violated. The State Court affirmed the conviction stating that Batson
did not meet the burden of proof set forth by Swain to prove discrimination. Batson appealed
and the case was brought before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts and established new burden of proof
requirements. They decided that a defendant no longer had to prove systematic discrimination
by the prosecution. Instead, a defendant could argue that their 14th Amendment rights were
violated if the prosecution used peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors due to race in
their specific case. Furthermore, the Court outlined necessary steps to determine if peremptory
challenges were racially discriminatory. A defendant must establish that he is part of a
cognizable racial group and that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges to dismiss
members of the defendant’s race. Once the defense establishes a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution. Then, the prosecution must explain
the peremptory challenge by providing race neutral justifications for the dismissal. Lastly, the
trial judge makes a decision as to whether the peremptory challenges were racially motivated and
thereby unconstitutional.
On a superficial level, it appears that courts have embraced the Batson decision. Courts
have extended Batson’s reach in decisions holding that venirepersons cannot be dismissed
because the defendant is of a different race (Powers v. Ohio, 1991) or gender (J.E.B. v. Alabama,
1994). The Supreme Court has also ruled that Batson violations existed in two landmark cases
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(Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005; Foster v. Chatman, 2016). In Miller-El, the prosecution dismissed 19
of the 20 eligible Black venirepersons; 10 were excused through peremptory challenges. The
Court noted “The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible
African-American venire members…Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity” (p.
432). Perhaps more important than the rate of exclusion of Blacks was how the prosecutors
justified their peremptory challenges. For example, the prosecution argued that they dismissed
Black venirepersons because of certain race neutral reasons (family members with criminal
history, views on rehabilitation and the death penalty) but did not dismiss White venirepersons
with the same characteristics. Therefore, because the prosecution only dismissed Black
venirepersons for things that also applied to White venirepersons, it appears that the true reason
for the peremptory challenge was racially motivated.
Similar discrepancies were noted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Foster v. Chatman
(2016). The prosecution justified removing a Black venireperson because he had a son the same
age as Foster but did not have a problem with White jurors who also had sons the same age as
Foster. Perhaps the most damaging evidence was the notes the prosecutor took during voir dire.
The notes highlighted potential jurors who were Black, notes with an “N” (for no) next to the
names of all Black prospective jurors, and a draft of an affidavit from an investigator comparing
the Black potential jurors stating “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors [this
one] might be okay” (Foster v. Chatman, 2016, p. 1). It is clear that the prosecution’s trial
strategy was motivated by explicit biases and stereotypes about Black people.
Although the Supreme Court upheld Batson in these specific cases, it would be erroneous
to believe that the protections afforded by Batson are sufficient or without major problems.
Notably, Batson challenges are rarely successful (Melilli, 1996). Failed Batson challenges are
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partly due to the fact that a sufficient race neutral reason is easy to provide. For example, after
two Black jurors were dismissed and the defense cited Batson in objection, the prosecution
explained the potential jurors’ facial hair was suspicious. The Supreme Court upheld the strikes
and said that race-neutral explanations do not need to be “persuasive or even plausible” (Purkett
v. Elem, 1995, p. 768). If courts do not always recognize explicit bias, how is it possible for
them to recognize the implicit biases that may be motivating attorneys during voir dire?

7

Chapter 3: Explicit and Implicit Bias in Voir Dire
Attorneys may be acting on explicit or implicit biases during jury selection. Explicit
biases are considered conscious and purposeful but implicit biases occur automatically and are
unconscious (Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001). Implicit biases are most likely to be expressed
in behavior when the situation is ambiguous, the behavior can be justified through non-racial
explanations, and individuals are taxed cognitively (Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen,
1999).
Attorneys may consciously rely on stereotypes when predicting how jurors will vote
because there is some empirical evidence illustrating in-group preferences. One meta-analysis
found juror bias toward other-race defendants. Specifically, there was a small but significant
racial bias reflected by participants giving longer sentences and voting guilty more often when
the defendant was of a different race from their own (Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005).
Although the effect was smaller than in previous meta-analyses (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994;
Sweeney & Haney, 1992), studies conducted since have provided additional evidence of outgroup bias. White mock jurors imposed harsher sentences, including the death penalty, on Black
defendants than White defendants (Dovidio, et al., 1997; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Forsterlee,
Forsterlee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Lynch & Haney, 2000; Schuller et al., 2009). Attorneys are
likely aware of the potential for jurors to hold in-group biases and their discrimination in jury
selection stems from an explicit trial strategy to exclude a category of jurors who is known to be
biased against their case.
However, juror decision-making is more complex than simple favoritism towards one’s
own group. For example, Black and White mock jurors read a trial summary about a defendant
who murdered his White wife. The defendant’s race was manipulated to be either White or
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Black. There were no significant differences between how the Black and White jurors rated the
Black defendant. However, Black jurors were more likely than White jurors to find the White
defendant guilty (Skolnick & Shaw, 1997). Similarly, in a study in which mock jurors read
about a negligent homicide, White participants did not rate the Black defendant differently than
the White defendant but Black participants gave higher guilt ratings to the White defendant
compared to the Black defendant (Abwender & Hough, 2001). One explanation for the results is
that Black juror were exhibiting racial bias and White jurors were not. However, using the
aversive racism framework, White jurors may have been policing themselves in such a manner to
not appear racist towards a Black defendant.
According to aversive racism theory, bias towards Blacks is most likely to be expressed
by Whites when it can be justified on non-race related grounds (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
Aversive racism theory explains that most White individuals will make a conscious effort to
avoid appearing racist. However, despite genuine egalitarian values and an explicit rejection of
stereotypes, it is difficult to suppress bias toward Black people under certain circumstances
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Discrimination is more likely to occur when a situation is socially
ambiguous and the appropriate behavior is unclear. The justification model of prejudice similarly
explains that although White individuals are not likely to commit overt acts of racism, they will
express prejudice through discrimination when it can be justified on nonracial grounds (Crandall
& Eshleman, 2003).
An early study demonstrated negative consequences stemming from aversive racism
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). White participants viewed a staged emergency in which the victim
was either Black or White. Additionally, participants either believed they were the only witness
or believed there were additional White people who saw the situation. Consistent with aversive
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racism theory, when participants believed they were the sole witness they helped the Black and
White victim with the same frequency. However, when participants thought there were other
witnesses, providing a reason other than race to not help the Black victim, participants helped the
Black victim 50% less often than the White victim (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).
Aversive racism also effects juror decision-making. For example, White and Black mock
jurors read trial scenarios in which the defendant was White or Black (Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000). The trials were also manipulated such that race was either salient or not in the crime. In
the salient condition, White jurors gave similar guilt ratings to the White and Black defendant
whereas Black jurors gave higher guilt ratings to the White defendant compared to the Black
defendant. However, in the non-salient condition, both White and Black jurors showed ingroup/out-group bias. White jurors gave the Black defendant higher guilt ratings compared to
the White defendant and Black jurors gave the White defendant higher guilt ratings compared to
the Black defendant. The race of the juror and defendant similarly affected sentencing
recommendations. Black jurors gave the Black defendant shorter sentences than the White
defendant and White jurors gave the White defendant shorter sentences than the Black defendant.
Therefore, when race was not an obvious issue, White mock jurors may not have been
consciously trying to avoid appearing racist and as aversive racism theory predicts, reacted in
discriminatory ways.
Another study illustrates the complexity of aversive racism effects. Mock jurors were
presented with a case with a White or Black defendant. When participants were told DNA
evidence was ruled inadmissible and to disregard it, participants who were judging a Black
defendant rated the defendant as more guilty, recommended longer sentences, and rated the
defendant to be more likely to reoffend than did those judging a White defendant. However,
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when the DNA was admissible, there were no differences in judgment between participants
judging the White defendant and Black defendant conditions (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, &
Gaertner, 2005). Furthermore, for the Black defendant, inadmissible DNA evidence was more
detrimental than admissible DNA evidence. It is possible that when trying to suppress the
evidence, mock jurors became cognitively fatigued. Because mock jurors were already
cognitively taxed, they may have experienced more difficulty in reducing their bias leading to
higher ratings of guilt. Additionally, scores on a Modern Racism scale (measuring explicit bias)
did not moderate any of the effects. These results are consistent with aversive racism
predictions; participants’ self-reported racism measures did not predict discrimination toward the
Black defendant, participants took advantage of using non-racial reasons to discriminate against
the Black defendant, and a high cognitive load made it more difficult to suppress bias.
Aversive racism effects reach beyond the judicial system. For example, White
participants read parts of an interview and rated the suitability of Black and White candidates for
a position. The candidates were manipulated to be very strong, moderate, or very weak.
Supporting aversive racism theory, there was no discrimination towards the Black applicant
when the candidates had strong qualifications or weak qualifications for the position. However,
when the candidate was moderately qualified the participants recommended the White applicant
significantly more than the Black applicant (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
Cognitive load is an important factor in the ability to suppress acting on biases and
stereotypes. For instance, when participants were not under cognitive load, regardless of
prejudicial attitudes, they penalized White defendants more often than Black jurors. However,
when participants were under a high cognitive load, prejudiced mock jurors penalized the Black
defendant more often that the White defendant (Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012). In another
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study, participants read about a criminal act in which the suspect was either a respected bank
employee or was a “hard drug addict” and rendered verdicts and sentences. When participants
were under a high cognitive load, they voted guilty more often and gave harsher sentences to the
drug addict compared to the bank employee. However, when the participants were under a low
cognitive load, there were no differences between suspect type in verdict or sentences
(Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen, 1999).
Regardless of explicit or implicit attitudes and motivations, some attorneys do appear to
use in-group/out-group racial stereotypes explicitly during voir dire. Some trial technique
manuals suggest that attorneys use venireperson demographic information such as age and
education to predict how they will judge a case (Mauet, 2002; Rothblatt, 1961; Haydock &
Sonsteng, 1999). In fact, the Supreme Court found the Texas jury selection manual allowed
prosecutors to ask potential jurors different questions based on their race. Because the questions
for Black venirepersons were intended to elicit answers that would provide attorneys with race
neutral reasons for excluding them, the varying questions were one way to mask explicitly
racially motivated peremptory challenges (Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005). However, there is reason
to believe attorneys’ implicit attitudes may also influence their decisions during voir dire.
Researchers have investigated whether attorneys are consciously aware of their
motivations when they exercise their peremptory challenges. Participants (students, law
students, and attorneys) were presented with two potential jurors in a mock trial in which the
defendant was Black. One juror was Black and the other was White. Knowing they had one
peremptory challenge left, participants overwhelmingly dismissed the Black juror compared to
the White juror. However, less than 10% of participants reported race as the reason for dismissal
(Sommers & Norton, 2007), citing instead, for example, features of their employment history.
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These results are informative on two fronts. First, race clearly influenced peremptory challenges
with Black venirepersons being excluded significantly more often than White venirepersons.
Second, 96% of participants gave race-neutral reasons when asked to explain their decision. It is
not clear whether attorneys were simply unaware of their motivations or that they did not want to
admit they excused a venireperson because they were Black. Either way, even if a Batson
challenge is raised by the defense, attorneys could easily provide race-neutral justifications to the
court and to themselves.
Attorneys performing voir dire may be especially prone to making biased decisions due
to aversive racism. Jurors provide information other than their race that an attorney could use to
explain a peremptory challenge. Furthermore, it is not always clear what the egalitarian decision
is, particularly when attorneys have motivations to not only appear unbiased but also to win their
case. It is unlikely that current protections against discrimination during voir dire are effective if
attorneys are acting on implicit biases, especially when discriminatory behavior can be explained
through race neutral reasons. Moreover, it appears that simple explicit warnings may not prevent
discrimination as intended.
There has been at least one study investigating if an explicit reminder of the Batson
decision reduced racial bias in attorneys’ exercise of their peremptory challenges (Kennard,
2011). Practicing attorneys were presented with two venireperson profiles and informed they
had one peremptory challenge left. One juror was White and the other juror was Black.
Additionally, attorneys were either reminded that it was unconstitutional to make jury selection
decisions based on race or did not receive the reminder. Those attorneys who did not receive the
reminder excused the White venireperson significantly more often than the Black venireperson.
Those who received a Batson reminder dismissed the White and Black venireperson with the
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same frequency. These results are inconsistent with previous work (Sommers & Norton, 2007)
because there was bias toward excluding White venirepersons and not Black venirepersons. It is
possible that two Supreme Court decisions that upheld Batson (Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005; Snyder
v. Louisiana, 2008) affected the attorneys in the Kennard (2011) study; the attorneys studied by
Sommers and Norton (2007) were not exposed to those decisions. Both studies found that
attorneys rarely listed race as a justification for their peremptory challenge indicating that
attorneys either did not want to appear racist or were unconsciously making decisions.

It is

important to recognize that although a Batson reminder reduced the racial discrepancies of
venirepersons struck, other research indicates explicit warnings are not effective in reducing
discrimination.
In another study examining peremptory challenges and explicit warnings, participants
were asked to act as prosecutors in a case in which a woman was on trial for murdering her
abusive husband. Participants were more likely to exclude the female venireperson compared to
the male venireperson and then provide gender-neutral justifications when asked to explain their
decisions. The addition of an explicit warning that a venireperson could not be dismissed due to
their gender did not reduce the likelihood that the female venireperson was excused. Participants
continued to exclude the female juror significantly more than the male juror but gave more
elaborate gender-neutral justifications for their peremptory challenge (Norton, Sommers, &
Brauner, 2007). It is important to remember that there is no explicit reminder about Batson prior
to jury selection; it is unlikely that the potential for a Batson challenge would deter
discrimination if explicit instructions do not necessarily have that effect.
The Batson decision was intended to make racially motivated peremptory challenges
more difficult, however the Supreme Court made faulty assumptions about the effectiveness of a
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Batson challenge. Attorneys do not need to explain their motivations for a peremptory challenge
unless opposing counsel raises Batson challenge. If that happens, attorneys are unlikely to admit
they dismissed venirepersons because of their race; attorneys know it is unconstitutional to do so
and likely do not want to appear racist. Furthermore, as explained by aversive racism theory,
attorneys may not be purposefully excluding Black jurors but unconsciously relying on
stereotypes. Batson assumes that judges will be able to detect attorneys’ implicit or explicit
motivations. However, given that attorneys can use any number of race neutral explanations for
dismissal, including a reason as implausible as suspicious facial hair (Purkett v. Elem, 1995),
judges would have to be mind-readers to determine the true reason for the challenge. As there is
no evidence suggesting judges can detect attorneys’ implicit biases, the legal system needs to
explore procedures other than Batson challenges to prevent racially biased peremptory
challenges.
Voir dire can be viewed as a hiring process in which serving on the jury is the job.
Attorneys want to “hire” individuals whom they believe will act and think in a way that will be
beneficial to them. Analogous to attorneys, employers are not legally permitted to make
decisions based on an individual’s race, gender, or religion (Civil Rights Act, 1964; Civil Rights
Act, 1991) However, similar to attorneys and juries, employers and companies are susceptible to
biased decision-making leading to discrimination in the workplace.
The American Psychological Association (APA) addressed discrimination in the
workplace in its Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) amicus brief. The brief explained that
stereotyping under certain conditions could create discriminatory consequences for stereotyped
groups (in this case women in the workplace). The APA provided two types of conditions that
promote stereotyping in the workplace that can also be present in jury selection. In an evaluation
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setting, the rarity of the stereotyped individual can make it more likely they will be perceived as
acting in a stereotypical way. Looking at voir dire as an evaluation setting, the rarity of Black
venirepersons can be a factor in jury selection. Black individuals were systematically excluded
from death penalty cases involving Black defendants (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010). Therefore,
if a Black individual does make it to voir dire, the infrequency may influence attorneys to rely on
stereotypes (e.g. Black jurors will be unable to be fair and impartial if the defendant is Black).
The brief also reported that the paucity of information available to evaluators increases the
likelihood of discrimination. Paucity was a three-pronged definition. First, the information is
limited beyond some convenient category (gender or race). Second, the information available is
ambiguous and can be interpreted in multiple ways. Last, information available about the
individual is irrelevant to the judgment the evaluator must make. Like rarity, paucity is also
present in jury selection. There is a narrow range of juror information available to attorneys and
it can be unrelated to how a potential juror will perform.
The APA also listed conditions in which there would be a reduction of stereotyping and
discrimination in the workplace, which may translate into jury selection. These conditions
included providing additional information about the employee and increasing attention to that
information. It is reasonable to think that more information about a juror could reduce
stereotypic thought, however if the information is irrelevant to the juror’s decision making, the
brief predicts that it could contribute to an increase in discrimination. The APA promoted
instilling motivational incentives to discourage discrimination. One motivational incentive that
has reduced discrimination in the workplace is accountability. Is it possible that holding
attorneys accountable, more than they currently are, will decrease the likelihood of racially
motivated peremptory challenges?
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Chapter 4: Accountability
Accountability is a two-pronged concept defined by the expectation that one may need to
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others and implies that there will be consequences
for actions depending on the individual’s justifications (Semin & Manstead, 1983; Tetlock,
1992). Attorneys may be unmotivated to control biases and continue to use racially motivated
trial strategies because there are no serious consequences for selecting jurors based on race.
Attorneys are aware they may need to produce race neutral reasons for challenging
venirepersons, but they are also aware that they are not held accountable in any real sense
because there are limited consequences if attorneys lose a Batson challenge. One repercussion is
the challenged venireperson becomes a juror with the possibility of a not guilty verdict..
Additionally, predecisional accountability has the strongest effects on decision-making
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). It is impossible for accountability to affect decision-making if a
person only becomes aware of it after they have made a decision. Because a Batson challenge
can only be made after a racially biased strike, it is unlikely to affect decision-making. Is it
possible that informing attorneys before voir dire that they will be fully accountable for their
decisions would minimize racial bias in jury selection?
Holding people accountable reduces bias in employment settings (Boudreau, et al., 1992;
Ford et al., 2004; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Nadler et al., 2014; Pendry & Macrac, 1996).
White sales managers evaluated two equally qualified applicants; one applicant was Black and
the other was White. The White applicants received more favorable ratings compared to the
Black applicant when participants knew they did not need to justify their evaluation. However,
when participants were informed they would need to justify their evaluations to their supervisor,
they rated Black and White applicants the same (Ford et al., 2004). Participants also rated a
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heterosexual applicant more positively than a homosexual applicant when they were not held
accountable but there were no differences in ratings when participants were held accountable
(Nadler et al., 2014). Although there is support that accountability can attenuate bias, it would be
erroneous to think that it is a “social or cognitive panacea” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 270).
Several factors influence the effectiveness of predecisional accountability.
The flexible contingency model (FCM) of predecisional accountability explains that
accountability can sometimes increase biases while at other times decrease them (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999). According to FCM, predecisional accountability attenuates bias when people
expect to justify their judgments and want to avoid looking foolish to others. To accomplish this
goal, individuals engage in effortful cognitive processes to reasonably justify their actions.
Individuals look for relevant information, anticipate counter arguments, consider them
impartially, and monitor the cues that are allowed to affect decision-making. When a decision is
originally made without self-critical attention to the judgment process but the decision requires
greater attention to the information provided, accountability reduces bias (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999).
Furthermore, accountability may also increase individuals’ accuracy in predicting others’
behavior, which would be beneficial to attorneys. Participants were presented with 16
“impression formation phase” responses from actual test takers on a personality-prediction task
and asked to predict how the individuals would respond to an additional 16 items presented in
the “personality-prediction phase”. Participants were assigned to a no accountability condition
(they knew their answers were confidential), a preexposure-accountability condition (they
learned they would need to justify their answers before viewing any test responses) or a
postexposure-accountability condition (they learned they would need to justify their answers
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after seeing the responses). Participants in the preexposure-accountability condition made
significantly more accurate predictions about the second set of responses compared to those who
were in the no accountability or postexposure-accountability conditions (Tetlock & Kim, 1987).
It is important to note that although participants in the postexposure-accountability condition
were aware they would need to justify their answers before responding, the accountability
manipulation failed to increase accuracy in their predictions. Therefore, parallel to the effects of
predecisional accountability on decision-making, accountability may also be more effective in
preventing bias than correcting for it (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Because a Batson challenge can
only be raised after a decision, it is unsurprising that it has little impact on reducing bias.
However, if attorneys know before voir dire they will be accountable for their choices they might
be more likely to evaluate the relevant information and impartially consider counter arguments,
resulting in fewer racially motivated peremptory challenges.
The FCM also explains and predicts when accountability amplifies bias. Accountability
can increase bias is when people rely on irrelevant cues (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). The desire to
avoid appearing foolish compels people to use all cues about a person, even ones that are not
related to a task. Additionally, cognitive load can lead to an increase in discrimination because
of implicit biases (Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen, 1999). For example, participants
were asked to predict a student’s grade point average after reading personal profiles. The
information they received included relevant information (e.g., how many hours the student
studies) and irrelevant information (e.g., the number of plants the student owns, how frequently
he plays tennis). Participants who believed they would be interviewed after the study
(accountable condition) were more likely to rely on the irrelevant information when predicting
GPA compared to those who were promised confidentiality (non-accountable condition; Tetlock
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& Boettger, 1989). In an attempt to prepare themselves for evaluation, participants gathered as
much data as possible, regardless of relevance. The accumulation of all possible data could be
problematic if attorneys pay attention to information that is irrelevant to their performance as a
juror.
Accountable people sometimes rely on stereotypes as cues resulting in discrimination.
Accountable participants were more likely to consider the age of a candidate as an informative
cue when evaluating job applicants, resulting in more negative evaluations of older than younger
applicants. Unaccountable participants did not exhibit the same judgment processes (Gordon,
Rozelle, & Baxter, 1988). In addition, accountability may make attorneys more biased during
voir dire if being accountable increases their cognitive load. If so, it is possible that accountable
attorneys may be able to avoid explicit reliance on information about race when making decision
but will be unable to correct for implicit racial biases.
Although attorneys may be correct that people of certain races tend to hold certain
attitudes, not every member of that race will subscribe to those beliefs. Attorneys may overlook
individual venireperson attitudes, even if they are favorable to their side, because of an explicit
trial strategy fueled by an overreliance on stereotypes about racial attitudes. Will accountable
attorneys look beyond race when a venireperson expresses attitudes inconsistent with racial
stereotypes?
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Chapter 5: Audience
Individuals seek general approval and acceptance from others (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the decision-maker’s audience can impact their choices.
For instance, when decision-makers know their audience’s views, they tend to make decisions
that are consistent with those views (Tetlock, 1983). Participants were asked to describe their
position on affirmative action, defense spending, and capital punishment. Participants in the no
accountability condition were informed their responses were confidential. In the three
accountable conditions, participants were told that they would need to justify and explain their
answers to another subject who was either liberal, conservative, or took an unknown position.
The views of the other subject (audience) influenced responses such that participants who
believed they would be discussing the topic with a liberal reported more liberal attitudes and
participants who believed they would be discussing the topic with a conservative reported more
conservative attitudes (Tetlock, 1983). Consistent with other accountability research (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999), participants in the three accountability conditions reported more complex
thoughts than participants in the no accountability condition. However, participants in the
unknown audience accountability condition reported the most complex thoughts. It is possible
that participants were more likely to weigh both sides knowing they would need to justify their
own views because the audience was unknown. These results are consistent with the idea that
individuals prefer to use less cognitive resources when making decisions and if the audience’s
opinion is known, they will simply align with the audience’s preference (Taylor & Fiske, 1978;
Tetlock, 1985).
When the audience is interested in how an individual comes to a final decision,
individuals are more likely to use effortful strategies when evaluating information compared to
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when the audience is exclusively interested in outcomes. If the audience is interested in the
process in which an individual came to a decision instead of exclusively examining the final
decision, accountable individuals will search for additional information analysis to justify their
choice (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Participants were asked to
role-play as a trial lawyer in a case in which their client wants to cease treatment for an incurable
disease. Participants read descriptions of a set of jurors, each juror paired with a description that
contained information about seven cues (e.g., age, education, gun ownership) and then
determined how likely it was that the potential juror supported assisted suicide. Participants in
the procedural accountability condition were informed that the cues they decided were important
would be displayed on a screen and they would engage in an interview explaining why they
made their decisions. Participants in the outcome accountability condition were told they would
receive feedback about their decisions and if they performed well they would receive a bonus of
$10, but there was no mention of an interview. Participants in the no accountability condition
were told their responses were confidential. Participants in the procedural accountability
condition used more of the available information when making judgments than those in the
outcome accountability condition and were more accurate compared to those in the “outcome
accountability” condition. Importantly, participants used information that included both relevant
and irrelevant cues, consistent with the idea that individuals have difficulty disregarding
irrelevant information when it is made available (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Furthermore,
participants in the outcome accountability condition had the poorest accuracy scores suggesting
that if individuals believe the audience is only concerned with the final result, they in turn will
not engage in effortful thought processes and are unlikely to be accurate when predicting
behavior (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996).
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Attorneys are likely to be concerned with the outcome of their decision during voir dire
for at least two reasons. First, before attorneys are required to explain their decision to a judge
(audience) opposing counsel needs to actually raise a Batson challenge. Otherwise they do not
need to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. Data illustrates the rate in which opposing
counsel raises a Batson challenge is low (Office of Indigent Defense Services, 2016) and
attorneys are aware of that fact. Second, attorneys are also knowledgeable that judges are likely
to overrule a Batson challenge if it is raised. In North Carolina, only 3% of Batson challenges
were sustained among over 150 death row inmates despite evidence of racial disparity in the vast
majority of the cases (Stubbs, 2016). Because attorneys understand they are unlikely to need to
explain their decisions and that their audience is likely to side with them, it is foreseeable that
they would only be concerned with the outcome of their decision and not engage in thoughtful
processing of relevant information apart from race.
Currently attorneys are not accountable for their decisions during voir dire in a way to
deter racial bias. However, it is clear that accountability can be effective in reducing
discrimination due to implicit bias and increase critical thinking under certain circumstances.
These conditions are not currently met in jury selection. First, a person needs to be aware of the
accountability before making a decision in order for bias reduction to occur (Lerner &Tetlock,
1999; Nadler et al., 2014; Tetlock and Kim, 1987). During voir dire, if attorneys need to
provide a race neutral explanation, they are only aware of it after decision-making. Second, the
type and amount of information affects the ability to ignore stereotypes. When accountable
people have both relevant and irrelevant cues to consider, they are more likely to overemphasize
irrelevant cues and may revert to decision-making based on implicit stereotypes (Gordon,
Rozelle, & Baxter, 1988; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Because the
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bias is implicit, people justify their decision with more elaborate explanations (Norton et al.,
2007). Attorneys may rely on a venireperson’s race and the accompanying stereotypes such that
they ignore other more relevant cues. If attorneys do need to justify their decision, it is possible
that their explanation simply includes more irrelevant race neutral information than would be
provided if there were fewer extraneous cues. Third, the decision-maker’s audience affects
decision-making. If the audience’s views are known, accountable individuals are likely to make
decisions consistent with the audience’s (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Tetlock, 1983). Furthermore, if
the audience is not concerned with how the decision-maker came to their decision, it is unlikely
that an accountable individual will examine cues relevant to their choice (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates,
1996). Attorneys know their audience, a judge, is unlikely to hear why they removed a Black
juror. If attorneys do need to provide an explanation they know that the judge will likely accept
flimsy race-neutral reasons and probably overrule the Batson challenge.
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Chapter 6: Overview of the Proposed Research
U.S. courts have addressed jury diversity over the past several decades (Batson v.
Kentucky, 1986; Foster v. Chatman, 2016; Peters v. Kiff, 1972) but archival data and empirical
research indicate that the corrective measures currently in place are distressingly ineffective.
Blacks continue to be underrepresented on juries despite the availability of a Batson challenge
(Baldus et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2007; Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Gabbidon, et al., 2008). If
raised, Batson challenges are rarely won because attorneys only need to provide a race neutral
reason for excusing a venireperson to successfully overcome the challenge (Melilli, 1996).
Importantly, these reasons do not need to be believable for a judge to accept them (Purkett v.
Elem, 1995). Given the emerging research on the improved quality of jury deliberations among
diverse juries (Lynch & Haney, 2011; Sommers, 2006) and the Constitutional right to serve on a
jury and be judged by a panel of peers, it is imperative that we look to other remedies in reducing
racial bias in peremptory challenges.
The goal of the research is to test the hypothesis that attorneys will exhibit less implicit
racial bias in peremptory challenges when they know they beforehand that they will be held
accountable for their decision-making. There is reason to believe accountability will only be
effective in reducing bias if attorneys are aware of the consequences prior to decision-making
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). We also examined the effects of accountability to the effects of a
Batson reminder on attorney decision-making when faced with rating potential jurors. Batson
warnings reminding participants of the law regarding peremptory challenges have been both
effective (Kennard, 2011) and ineffective in reducing bias (Norton et al., 2007). However,
making attorneys accountable instead of simply reminding them of the law may be the most
effective way to reduce bias. We examined the likelihood that attorneys would report racial bias.
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According to aversive racism theory (Gartner & Dovidio, 1986) and previous research, (Kennard
2011; Sommers & Norton, 2007), it is more likely that attorneys will provide race neutral factors
compared to racially motivated factors when explaining their decisions.
The present study expanded on Kennard (2011) and Sommers & Norton (2007)
methodology. Participants were presented twelve venireperson profiles with pictures varying in
race, gender, and attitude. They rated each potential juror on a 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7
(extremely likely) Likert scale on how likely they would use a peremptory challenge on that
juror. After viewing all twelve profiles participants chose two venirepersons to use their
peremptory challenges on and gave a short explanation. The current study explored the effects
of accountability and audience on reducing racial bias in attorneys’ decision-making.
I hypothesized an interaction between accountability, venireperson race, venireperson
attitude, and judicial record with different patterns of results depending on whether the Black
venirepersons hold attitudes that are pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or neutral. Specifically, when
the judge has a record of overruling Batson challenges, attorneys without accountability will be
significantly more likely to dismiss or want to dismiss Black jurors than will accountable
attorneys, irrespective of venireperson attitudes; accountable attorneys will be influenced by the
venireperson’s attitude and not their race. When the judge has a record of upholding Batson
challenges, venireperson’s attitudes and not his/her race will affect attorneys’ decisions to strike,
irrespective of attorney accountability. Lastly, the manipulations will not affect the nature of the
explanations attorneys provide for dismissing a juror. The frequency of race neutral reasons will
be near ceiling level.
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Chapter 7: Methods
I created venireperson profiles that were distinctly pro-defense, pro-prosecution, or
ambiguous for Study 1. I conducted a pilot study to guarantee that participants perceived the
twelve profiles I created as intended.
Participants
I recruited participants (N = 10) for the pilot study from the Graduate Psychology
Department at John Jay College. I excluded data from one participant because they
misunderstood the instructions, resulting in nine participants.
Design and Materials
I created the twelve venireperson profiles by varying the venirepersons’ occupations and
their responses to the Juror Bias Scale (JBS; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983, see Appendix A).
From data gathered by the Washington Post (2015), I selected occupations that are more likely to
be held by individuals with liberal, conservative, or neutral political and social views. The four
occupations that were paired with pro-defense profiles were social worker, midwife, union
organizer, and yoga instructor. The four occupations that were paired with pro-prosecution
profiles were petroleum geologist, urologist, car salesman, and farmer. The four occupations
paired with ambiguous profiles were plumber, motel owner, pilot, and pawnbroker.
I also varied the venirepersons’ responses to the questions on the JBS so that they
indicated the venireperson held pro-prosecution, ambiguous, or pro-defense attitudes. For
example, venirepersons who were pro-defense disagreed, strongly disagreed, or very strongly
disagreed to the statement “out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty for the
crime for which they are charged”. Pro-prosecution venirepersons responded that they agreed,
strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed to the same statement and ambiguous venirepersons
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responded that they neither disagreed nor agreed. Appendix B has all twelve venireperson
responses to the JBS.
Procedure
Participants clicked on a Qualtrics link that informed them that they would be reading
profiles of potential jurors and evaluating them. Specifically, they were asked to adopt the role
of a prosecuting attorney and rate the profiles for how favorable they would be to the
prosecution’s side on a scale of 1 (Extremely Unfavorable) to 7 (Extremely Favorable). The
profiles of potential jurors were randomly presented and rated one at a time. After completion,
participants were thanked for their time.
Results
Data Analytic Strategy
I collapsed the twelve venireperson profiles into three sets (pro-prosecution, ambiguous,
pro-defense) by taking the mean of the four profiles in each category. Then, I conducted a
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Favorability
Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been
violated, X2 (N = 2) = 3.35, p = .19. There was a significant linear trend, F (2,7) = 127.97, p <
.001, ηp2 = .94, such that the 3 sets were all significantly different from each other. Specifically,
participants rated the pro-defense venirepersons (M = 1.92, SD = 0.70) to be less favorable to the
prosecution than the ambiguous jurors (M = 4.19, SD = 0.65), p < .001, d = 3.57, 95% CI [3.27,
3.89]. Participants also rated the pro-defense venireperson to be significantly less favorable to
the prosecution than the pro-prosecution venirepersons (M = 6.03, SD = 0.44), p < .001, d =7.56,
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95% CI [7.20, 7.71]. The ambiguous venirepersons were also rated as significantly less favorable
than the pro-prosecution venirepersons, p < .001, d =3.51 95% CI [3.28, 3.76].
Study One
Participants
Two hundred forty-nine prosecutors and law students completed the survey. I found
prosecutors’ emails online and from other researchers conducting studies with attorneys. I
emailed them asking if they would like to participate in the study and provided a brief
description of the task and compensation. The link to the survey was embedded in the email (see
Appendix C).
Law students were eligible to participate in the study if they had experience with mock
voir dire or had taken a class or seminar covering jury selection. I emailed faculty at 85 law
schools throughout the county, requesting that they send an email to their current students or
students they may have previously taught who were still in school. I also asked if I could send a
recruitment email on the school’s listserv. The link to the survey was embedded in these emails. I
also posted about the study on social media (Facebook).
Design
The study featured a 3 (Judicial record: judge likely to overrule Batson challenges vs.
judge likely to uphold Batson challenges vs. control) × 2 (Accountability: present vs. absent) ×
2 (Venireperson Race: Black vs. White) × 2 (Venireperson Gender: male vs. female) × 3
(Venireperson Attitudes: pro-prosecution vs. pro-defense. vs. ambiguous) mixed factorial design
with all 3 venireperson variables being within-subject manipulations. Judicial record and
accountability were between-subjects variables.
Materials
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Venireperson faces. Twelve faces were selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma,
Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). The database is intended for scientific research and provides
high-resolution, standardized photographs of males and females from different races and
ethnicities. All faces were shown from the shoulder up wearing a grey top. Norming data were
available for each individual. These data included information about race and age as well as
subjective ratings of attractiveness by independent judges. Attractiveness was rated on a 1 (not at
all) to 7 (extremely) scale (for more about the Chicago Face Database see Ma et al., 2015)
I chose 3 White male faces, 3 White female faces, 3 Black male faces, and 3 Black
female faces that were similar in age (perceived age ranged from 21 years-old to 30 years-old)
and attractiveness. A t-test revealed attractiveness did not significantly differ between the 6
White faces (M = 3.86, SD = .01) and the 6 Black faces (M = 3.80, SD = .07), F (2,10) = .71, p =
.42, d= 1.25, 95% CI [1.23, 1.27].
Venireperson profile. I used a 12 x 12 Latin Square design to counterbalance the 12
(three pro-prosecution, three pro-defense, 3 ambiguous) juror profiles from the pilot testing with
the black and white faces. Each of the twelve faces were paired with each of the twelve distinct
juror profiles once such that every profile appeared equally as often with a man and woman and
Black and White person. Specifically, the attitudes (pro-prosecution vs. pro-defense vs.
ambiguous) were fully crossed with race (Black vs. White) and gender (male vs. female).
Furthermore, the order in which juror profiles appeared was randomized to prevent order effects.
Qualtrics Survey Design. The Qualtrics program randomly assigned participants to one
of twelve different “chutes” corresponding with one of the arms of the Latin Square design.
Each chute held the profiles of twelve potential jurors that varied in attitude (pro-prosecution,
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ambiguous, or pro-defense) paired with the individual pictures that varied in race and gender as
specified by the Latin Square design.
Summary of Case Facts. Participants read a brief description of the defendant and
victim in the case and a summary of case facts (see Appendix D). I used the trial scenario from
Norton and Sommers (2007). A Black defendant was charged with one count of battery with
serious bodily injury. The prosecution claimed that the defendant broke into the victim’s house,
grabbed a lamp, and repeatedly hit the victim with it during an interrupted robbery. The
Caucasian victim could not identify the defendant but blood and hair with DNA were left at the
scene. The defense claims that because there was no positive identification someone else was
the attacker and questioned the validity of the DNA results.
Accountability. Participants in all conditions were told that a sample of attorneys had
previously rated the juror profiles for their favorability to the prosecution and that they were
eligible for a $15 bonus if their two peremptory challenges matched the juror profiles that
attorneys had rated as being the least favorable to the case. Participants in the accountability
present conditions received additional instructions stating that a panel of legal professionals
would review their peremptory challenge decisions and if a participating judge believed that the
decisions were biased they would not be eligible for the $15 bonus. Participants in the
accountability absent conditions did not receive any additional instructions beyond the potential
for the $15 bonus.
Judicial Record. Participants in the judge likely to overrule Batson challenges condition
read that the judge reviewing their decision had overruled Batson challenges 75% of the time
they were raised (siding with the prosecutor). Attorneys in the judge likely to uphold Batson
challenges condition read that the judge reviewing their decision had upheld Batson challenges
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75% of the time they were raised (siding with the defense). Participants in the judge control
condition read that they should proceed to the next page and received no information about
judicial record.
Dependent Variables
Probability of Strike. Participants rated the likelihood that they would use a peremptory
challenge after viewing each profile on a scale of 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Final Peremptory Challenge Decision. After viewing all twelve profiles, participants
were asked to select the two jurors that they would like to use their peremptory challenges on.
They were instructed that they could review the jurors’ profiles before making their decision.
Justification. An open-ended question asked attorneys to explain their peremptory
challenge decisions in about thirty words.
Demographic Information. Each participant provided basic demographic information
including age, gender, geographic location, an estimate of the number of voir dires in which they
had participated, and if they were currently a law student.
Procedure
Participants clicked on the Qualtrics link that took them to the study. Participants read an
informed consent and those who wished to continue could do so by clicking on the “next”
button. (see Appendix E). Next, Qualtrics sorted participants into one of the twelve combinations
of juror profiles and photos. All participants played the role of a prosecuting attorney in a case
for which they had two peremptory strikes. To add an incentive to decide as they would in a real
case, subjects were informed that if they removed the jurors who were pre-rated as damaging to
the prosecution, they would receive an additional $15. Participants read a brief description of the
defendant and victim in the case and a summary of case facts. Next, participants in the
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accountability present condition received the accountability warning described above.
Participants in the accountability absent condition did not receive that information. Then all
participants read about the judicial record of the presiding judge (or not if in the neutral
condition).
Participants viewed potential jurors one at a time and rated the likelihood that they would
use a peremptory challenge on that juror on a scale of 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely
likely). After participants repeated the process for all twelve profiles, they chose the two
potential jurors they would use their peremptory challenges on. Participants provided written
explanations for their decisions in thirty words or less. Last, participants answered an attention
check (“did you play a prosecutor or defense attorney in this study?”), demographic questions,
were debriefed, and provided compensation information.
Data Analytic Plan
Likelihood of striking. Due to a programing error, the within-subjects design was not
fully crossed as planned. Therefore, instead of viewing twelve distinct venireperson profiles (a
combination of race × attitude × gender), participants viewed some combination of eight distinct
profiles with the remaining four profiles being repeats of a previously viewed race × attitude ×
gender combination (for the specific breakdown of the presentation of profiles, see Appendix F).
For example, participants in Block 1 did not see the within-subjects combination of a Black male
who held pro-prosecution attitudes. To be clear, participants did not view the same profile or
picture more than once. Although participants were not exposed to a fully crossed within design,
every within condition was presented across the full dataset. Consequently, instead of using
ANOVAs as planned, I analyzed the data with hierarchal linear models (HLM).
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The HLM computes estimates for each combination of conditions to which a participant
was exposed. The full crossing of conditions within the dataset as a whole means the HLM is
able to compute an estimate for each combination; because each combination is present for twothirds of the participants, the estimate for each combination is based only on the two-thirds of the
sample that was exposed to that combination. The HLM makes these calculations without
needing to impute or replace any observations. The between-subjects analyses, which test the
primary hypotheses, are based on the full dataset. Any interaction of a between-participants
factor and a within-participants factor takes advantage of the HLM’s properties as described
above.
Final exclusion analyses. I analyzed the final peremptory choices using a mixed effect
logistic regression and frequencies.
Justification analyses. Two independent research assistants, blind to hypotheses, coded
the participants’ short answers explaining their exclusion decisions. The coding scheme
included four sections (race, gender, occupation, and attitudes) with several subsections (see
Appendix G). The researchers indicated when a short answer included those items by marking a
1 in a spreadsheet. Researchers marked a 0 if the short answer did not include an item. I
resolved any discrepancies between the coders. I analyzed participants’ open-ended responses
explaining why they struck the two venirepersons using binary logistic regressions. I conducted
separate binary logistic regressions for each of the four major categories coded as a reason for
striking and used accountability and judicial history as predictors. I also included all the
potential interactions between the predictors.
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Chapter 8: Results
Descriptive Statistics
In total 249 people completed the survey. Nine participants failed the attention check and
were removed from analysis. Participants (N = 240, 102 men, 135 women, three preferred not to
answer) consisted of 93 prosecutors and 147 law students from 33 different states. Participants
varied in their experience in conducting voir dires. Nearly half (n = 122) had only participated in
mock voir dires, but 50 participants had conducted 31 or more voir dires (Table 1). The majority
of participants were between the ages of 20-30 (68.3%) compared to participants over 31 years
old (31.7%). The sample was ethnically diverse but the majority of participants identified as
Caucasian (Table 2).
Likelihood to exclude venirepersons.
I used R statistical software to analyze participants’ ratings of how likely they would be
to exclude venirepersons. Specifically, I used the “lme4” package with the “lmer” function
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). I computed the p-values using the “lmerTest”
package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, Christensen, 2017), and calculated degrees of freedom using
the “Satterthwaite” method (Satterthwaite, 1946). I ran a mixed model to test Hypothesis 1 and
entered accountability, judicial instructions/preference, race, attitude, and their interactions as
fixed effects. I used successive difference contrasts. The primary results of interest in these
analyses are the unstandardized regression coefficients for the condition indicator. These
coefficients represent estimates of the expected population mean difference between the
conditions on the outcome measure. Using these estimates, I derived estimates of the
standardized mean difference (i.e., Cohen’s d) between the groups by dividing the coefficients
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by the residual standard deviation from their respective regressions. I will refer to this analog of
Cohen’s d as 𝑑′ (Gettings, 2017; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2017).
Venireperson attitude was the only significant predictor of participants’ ratings of how
likely they would be to exclude a venireperson. The difference in likelihood to exclude between
pro-defense and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.59, p < .001, t (235.66) = 49.68,
d’= 2.85, 95% CI [2.79, 2.99]; participants were more likely to exclude pro-defense
venirepersons compared to ambiguous venirepersons. The difference between pro-prosecution
and pro-defense venirepersons was also significant, b = -4.08, p < .001, t (236.06)= -78.34, d’= 4.49, 95% CI [-4.71, -4.28]; indicating participants were less likely to exclude pro-prosecution
venirepersons compared to pro-defense venirepersons. The remaining main effects and
interactions were not significant (see Table 3).
In order to provide the strongest test of whether the 3-way interactions differed by race, I
analyzed the 3-way interaction of judicial instructions, accountability, and attitude within each
level of race. I ran HLMS separately on the data for the black and white venirepersons, entering
accountability, judicial instructions, attitude, and their interactions as fixed effects. Venireperson
attitude was the only significant predictor on participants’ ratings of how likely they would be to
exclude a venireperson. Among black venirepersons, the difference in likelihood to exclude
between pro-defense and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.54, p < .001, t (224.01)
=27.68, d’=2.82, 95% CI [2.62, 3.02]. The difference between pro-prosecution and pro-defense
venirepersons was also significant, b = -4.00, p < .001, t (231.92) = - 34.69, d ‘=-4.45, 95% CI [4.69, -4.19]. The remaining main effects and interactions were not significant (see Table 3).
Among white venirepersons, the difference in likelihood to exclude between pro-defense
and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.59, p < .001, t (224.01)= 31.18, d’=2.78,
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95% CI [2.60, 2.95]. The difference between pro-prosecution and pro-defense venirepersons was
also significant, b = -4.15, p < .001, t (231.92)= -39.04, d’=-4.46, 95% CI [-4.69, -3.75]. The
remaining main effects and interactions were not significant (see Table 3).
I calculated the estimated marginal means in R using the emmeans function in the
emmeans package (Lenth, 2018). As can be seen in Table 4, attitude is the only significant
predictor in likelihood ratings. The 4-way interactions were not significant nor were the 3- way
interactions within race. There were no meaningful differences between black and white
venireperson ratings.
Final exclusion decisions
I analyzed the choice outcome using a mixed effects logistic regression, using the glmer
function from R’s lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) with the binomial family and logit link to
investigate which venirepersons attorneys chose to exclude after viewing all twelve profiles.
Standard significance testing for the full 4-way interactions was not possible due to the large
standard errors owning to the extreme imbalance in choices between attitude conditions (Table
5). However, the effect of attitude is clear; participants chose to exclude pro-defense
venirepersons 435 times out of 477 total exclusions. Participants chose to exclude ambiguous
venirepersons 24 and pro-prosecution venirepersons 18 times out of 477 total exclusions.
Qualitative responses
Participants explained their exclusion decisions by noting venirepersons’ attitudes more
than any other reason. Of those attitudes, participants were more concerned about the
venirepersons mistrust of the police and criminal justice system than any other attitude. Notably
no one stated gender as a motivating factor for their exclusions and race was only mentioned five
times. See Table 6 for the full frequency breakdown of reasons cited.
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I analyzed participants’ open-ended responses using binary logistic regressions in R using
the glm function and successive difference contrasts. I conducted the binary logistic regressions
for explanations citing race, gender, occupation, and attitude and used accountability and judicial
history and their interactions as predictors. There were no significant main effects or significant
interactions for any of the four coded categories.
Because gender and race were not mentioned enough times for any meaningful
significance testing, I will only be reporting the specific effects of accountability, instructions,
and their interactions on occupation and attitude. Accountability did not predict if venirepersons
justified their exclusions stating occupation, β = 0.28, SE = 0.45, z = 0.62, p = 0.53, OR =1.32,
95% CI [0.54, 3.27}. Judicial history did not predict if venirepersons justified their exclusions
stating occupation. There was no difference between participants in the judicial overrule
condition and judicial uphold condition in predicting occupation for a stated justification, β = 0.32, SE = 0.57, z = -0.57, p = 0.57, OR = 0.72, 95% CI [0.22, 2.24]. Similarly, there was no
difference between participants who did not receive any judicial information and those in the
judicial overrule condition in predicting occupation for a stated justification, β = 0.47, SE= 0.56,
z = 0.84, p = 0.40, OR = 1.60, 95% CI [0.54, 5.00]. The interactions between accountability and
judicial history were also not significant predictors in participants stating occupation for a reason
for exclusion.
Accountability and judicial history were not significantly related to participants justifying
their exclusions stating venireperson attitude. Specifically, accountability did not predict if
venirepersons justified their exclusions by citing the venirepersons’ attitude, β = 0.27, SE = 0.55,
z = 0.85, p = 0.62, OR =1.31, 95% CI [0.45, 4.44]. Judicial history did not predict if
venirepersons justified their exclusions stating occupation. There was no difference between
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participants in the judicial overrule condition and judicial uphold condition in predicting attitude
for a stated justification, β = 0.62, SE = 0.73, z = 0.85, p = 0.39, OR = 1.86, 95% CI [0.47,
10.03]. Similarly, there was no difference between participants who did not receive any judicial
information and those in the judicial overrule condition in predicting attitude for a stated
justification, β = -0.76, SE = 0.71, z = -1.07, p = 0.28, OR= 0.47, 95% CI [0.09, 1.74]. The
interactions between accountability and judicial history were also not significant predictors for
participants stating attitude for a reason for exclusion.
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Chapter 9: Discussion
I investigated whether accountability and judicial record affected racial bias in
participants’ peremptory challenges decisions. My first hypothesis was that there would be a
four-way interaction between accountability, judicial record, venireperson race, and venireperson
attitude with different patterns of results depending on whether the black venireperson held
attitudes that were pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or neutral. Specifically, I predicted when the
venireperson was Black there would be a three-way interaction of judicial record, accountability,
and venireperson attitudes that would be different than when the venireperson was White. When
the judge had a record of overruling Batson, participants that were not accountable would be
significantly more likely to dismiss black jurors compared to white jurors than would those
participants who were accountable, irrespective of the venirepersons’ attitudes. I predicted that
participants who were accountable would be influenced by the venirepersons’ attitudes and not
their race. I hypothesized that when the judge had a record of upholding Batson challenges,
venirepersons’ attitudes and not his/her race would affect participants’ decisions, irrespective of
attorney accountability.
My first hypothesis was not supported. There were no significant interactions among
accountability, judicial record, venireperson race, and venireperson attitude on attorneys’ ratings
of the likelihood that they would challenge or final exclusion of venirepersons. The only
significant predictor of participants’ ratings of venirepersons and their final exclusion decision
was venireperson attitude. Participants excluded pro-defense venirepersons in their final
decision significantly more often compared to ambiguous or pro-prosecution venirepersons
regardless of any other manipulation. When participants were asked how likely they were to use
a peremptory challenge on venirepersons, pro-defense venireperson received significantly higher
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scores compared to pro-prosecution or ambiguous venirepersons. Ambiguous venirepersons
received significantly higher scores than pro-prosecution venirepersons. The ratings were
unrelated to accountability, race, or judicial record.
My second hypothesis was that the manipulations would not affect the nature of the
explanations attorneys provided for dismissing jurors; the frequency of race neutral reasons
would be near ceiling level. The results supported this hypothesis but it is important to note that
this hypothesis was based on the premise that participants would make racially biased decisions
but not state that race was a motivating factor. Therefore, although participants justified their
peremptory challenges by emphasizing the venireperson attitude and not race, it was because
attitude actually influenced their decisions. Participants noted venirepersons’ specific answers
on the on JBS and venirepersons’ occupations as justifications for their decisions. Only four
participants mentioned race as the reason for using their peremptory challenge on a venireperson.
These results are consistent with the HLM results demonstrating attitude was the only significant
predictor in exclusion and attorney ratings on likelihood to use a peremptory challenge. They are
also consistent with previous research examining how attorneys justify their decisions during
Batson challenges by using race-neutral explanations (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Grosso &
O’Brien, 2012; Kennard, 2011; Sommers & Norton, 2007).
However, unlike previous research (Sommers & Norton, 2007), race did not influence
attorneys’ decisions. There are a number of possibilities for why race did not affect participants’
ratings of venirepersons or their peremptory challenges. The Flexible Correction Model (FCM)
explains that if a person is aware of the bias he or she may hold and is motivated to inhibit it, he
or she can attempt to correct for it (Wegener & Petty, 1997). It is possible that participants knew
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people would be examining their judgments and reading their justifications and therefore
corrected any biased thoughts or behaviors.
It may have been transparent that I was examining race and participants could have
changed their answers, implicitly or explicitly, in hopes of not appearing racist. Participants who
were told about a judge’s history with Batson challenges may have realized the nature of the
study. If participants knew I was examining race, they may have responded in a socially
appropriate manner to avoid appearing racist. However, other research used a forced choice
methodology and found racial (Sommers & Norton, 2007) and gender discrimination (Norton et
al., 2007). Furthermore, previous research gave participants an explicit warning against using
gender as a reason to exclude a juror but it did not decrease gender discrimination (Norton et al.,
2007). Instead, participants continued to dismiss a female juror at a higher rate than a male juror
but gave more elaborate justifications for their decision-making. In another study, race affected
the selection decisions of participants who received a Batson reminder before reviewing potential
jurors but the racial bias was in the opposite direction of what was predicted; white
venirepersons were challenged more often than black venirepersons (Kennard, 2011).
Participants in the present study rated twelve venirepersons, varying not only in race but also
gender, in an effort to disguise the true nature of the study. Yet, I did not replicate previous
findings of racial discrimination despite using an arguably less obvious cover story.
Another potential explanation for why there were no effects of race on attorneys’
decisions could be the strength of the venireperson attitude manipulation. Aversive racism
theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) predicts that unless there is ambiguity, people are less likely
to exhibit racism. The theory explains that when people are presented with a situation that can
obviously been seen as discriminatory, they will avoid appearing racist or making racist
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decisions. However, when the situation is ambiguous, people are more likely to favor a white
person/candidate over a black person/candidate (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986). There were clearly pro-defense and pro-prosecution venirepersons therefore
making race a non-issue and the appropriate behavior was clear. However, participants’ ratings
on ambiguous venirepersons were not consistent with aversive racism theory. I would have
predicted participants to have rated the likelihood of excusing black and white venirepersons
who held ambiguous attitudes differently, with black venirepersons’ receiving higher likelihood
to exclude ratings than white venirepersons). However, there was no effect of race even for
those venirepersons with ambiguous attitudes.
It is possible that I got attitude effects and Sommers and Norton (2007) and Kennard
(2011) did not precisely because of the amount of relevant information I provided for each
potential juror. Sommers and Norton (2007) and Kennard (2011) described potential jurors in
just a few sentences indicating their jobs and if they were skeptical of statistics. Participants in
those studies had less information to use when deciding which venireperson to excuse and
therefore could not rely on venireperson attitude in the same way participants in my study did.
Aversive racism theory would predict that because the two venireperson profiles in Sommers and
Norton (2007) and Kennard (2011) were ambiguous, neither description clearly favoring the
defense or prosecution, participants would rely on race to make a decision. Although Kennard
(2011) found that participants excused more white venirepersons compared to black
venirepersons, it could be due to participants attempting to overcorrect their biases. Regardless,
the distinction in the amount of information participants received is noteworthy not just because
of the different results but also because in jurisdictions where venireperson information is
minimal race effects may be more likely to occur.
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History is another possible explanation for the different results. The three recent
Supreme Court cases upholding Batson (Foster v. Chatman, 2016; Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005;
Snyder v. Louisiana, 2008) may have affected participants’ jury selection strategies. When
Sommers and Norton (2007) conducted their research these Supreme Court decisions had not
occurred. Therefore, participants may not have been as aware of possible repercussions for
making racially biased peremptory challenges. Participants now may be more attuned to their
own racial biases and stereotypes and make an effort to control for them. For example, despite
using a very similar methodology to that used in the earlier research, Kennard (2011) found race
effects in the opposite direction with the white venireperson being dismissed more often than the
black venireperson potentially because of an overcorrection. The higher rate of excluding white
venirepersons supports the theory that attorneys may be more sensitive to racial discrimination
and attempt to control for it in ways now that were not present before Miller-El v. Dretke (2005)
and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008).
Replication issues
Psychology is in the midst of a replication crisis after a team of researchers struggled to
replicate a number of well-known experiments (Nosek et. al., 2015). The Open Science
Collaborative (OSC) chose 100 recent papers and each study was conducted one time. The
replication teams used the original materials when possible and determined the sample size
required by using the original effect sizes. Despite trying to emulate the original experiments as
much as possible, only about 35 percent of the effects in the new studies were significant at p <
.05. Without consistent replication of experimental findings, the fear is that psychologists are
making Type I errors and finding significant effects when there are actually no effects. The OSC
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highlighted two conditions necessary to explore in replication studies: fidelity and power (Irvine,
Hoffman, & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2018).
With respect to fidelity, my study was investigating the same theoretical issues as
Sommers and Norton (2007) but the methodology was very different. The current study
provided more information about the venirepersons, varied gender, and manipulated
accountability and judicial history whereas Sommers and Norton (2007) did not. The additional
variables could have changed how participants responded to the questions. Another key
difference in methodology is Kennard (2011) and Sommers and Norton (2007) used a force
choice methodology with participants choosing between two venirepersons where as I presented
participants with twelve venirepersons and asked them to rate venirepersons throughout the
experiment. With respect to fidelity, perhaps it is not surprising that my study did not replicate
Sommers and Norton (2007) when considering how much our methodologies differed.
In addition to fidelity, power plays an important role in replications. The OSC attempted
to replicate each of the 100 studies once. However, a follow-up study, the Many Labs project
(MLP) had 36 different independent laboratories attempt to replicate each of the original 16
studies used in OSC (Klein et al., 2014). The data were pooled and 85% of the original studies
were successfully replicated. The MLP had more power to test for effects than the arguably
underpowered OSC. The present study was designed to be able to detect a small effect size (d =
0.20) with an alpha level of 0.80. I lost some power due to the missing data but even if the
experiment had the planned power, it may not have been enough to replicate the results from
Sommers and Norton (2007).
The effect sizes in published studies tend to be biased from true population effect sizes
due to publication bias and selective reporting (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015). Sommers and
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Norton (2007) provide odds ratios with p-values however the true effects are possibly better
discussed in terms of Cohen’s d for each population they tested. Although there were significant
differences in dismissing the black juror compared to the white juror in college (p = .03) and law
student (p < .05) populations the Cohen’s d effect sizes are below 0.20 (a small effect size) for
both the college (d = 0.17) and law student (d = 0.19) samples. The attorney sample had the
largest effect size (d = 0.33) despite not reaching statistical significance (p = .06). However,
when judgments were collapsed across population type (college students, law students, and
attorneys), the black juror was significantly more likely to be dismissed compared to the white
juror (p = .001) with an effect size larger than any single population (d = 0.58). Additionally,
although Sommers and Norton (2007) provide the number of participants in each population they
do not provide the number of participants in each cell. Therefore, it is possible that Sommers
and Norton (2007) had inflated effect sizes when combining populations. If so, replicating the
results with the power in the current study would be nearly impossible.
A remaining question is, did Sommers and Norton (2007) capture a true effect and are my
results indicative of a Type II error or did Sommers and Norton (2007) make a Type 1 error and
find an effect when there was not any? Keeping in mind that Kennard’s (2011) methodology
was close to Sommers and Norton (2007) and failed to replicate bias against Black
venirepersons, it is arguable that the original finding was due to random error or variables that
were outside the authors’ control. However, archival and anecdotal data (Equal Justice Initiative,
2010; Gabbidon et al., 2008; Grosso & O’Brien, 2012) overwhelmingly suggests that attorneys
do consider race during voir dire. It is possible that Sommers and Norton (2007), Kennard
(2011), and the present research all captured true effects with history, different methodologies,
and power levels explaining the varying results.
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Batson in the Future
An additional issue to consider is the possibility that attitudes can serve as a proxy for
race in the real world. Several common questions on voir dire questionnaires probe for
information that may be correlated with race. For example, an attorney can excuse a potential
juror if they have been a victim of a crime, have a relative in prison, or have had poor
interactions with police officers. Although answers to those questions are not directly race-based
they are not independent from race and may tap into implicit biases. Black people are less likely
to trust the criminal justice system (Brigham & Wasserman, 1999) and are more likely to be a
victim of crime compared to White people (Sherman, 2001). Attitudes are a legal and legitimate
reasons to excuse venirepersons. To the extent that some attitudes are correlated with race, it
may appear as if attorneys challenged venirepersons because of their race when in fact it was
their attitudes that attorneys found problematic.
Several field studies establishing Black venirepersons being excluded significantly more
often than White venireperson have not accounted for attitude as a covariate. For example, data
from North Carolina show that prosecutors used peremptory challenges significantly more often
on Black compared to White people (Rose, 1999). However, there is no mention of excused
venireperson attitude. Furthermore, the Equal Justice Initiative’s (2010) report on racially
motivated peremptory challenges discusses several alarming statistics about the disproportionate
amount of strikes used to exclude Black people from juries, but it does not mention whether their
attitudes were detrimental to the prosecution. However, the report does note that prosecutors
have frequently stated Black venirepersons live in a “high crime” neighborhood or receive food
stamps. These factors could impact venirepersons’ attitudes making them less favorable to the
prosecution, but without data explicitly stating their attitudes, it seems that the prosecution is
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making race based assumptions about how they would view a case. The present study found that
race was not a significant factor in attorney decision-making and that venireperson attitude was
the only influential factor. Perhaps if voir dires could extract more information from potential
jurors, attorneys would look at attitudes as a better predictor of trial outcome compared to race.
Indeed, although it is a minority-held view, some social psychology scholars believe that
prejudice is not as rampant in the real world as in the laboratory but rather a part of a liberal bias
(Redding, 2004).
It may be time to consider the elimination of peremptory challenges if the law continues
to allow prosecutors to use race as a proxy for attitudes due to implicit or explicit bias. After the
Foster v. Chatman (2016) decision, several law reviews expressed disappointment in the
Supreme Court’s failure to address implicit bias. For example an article in the Iowa Law review
stated”…the Court did not acknowledge how attitudes of exclusion are less intentional today and
more nuances, implicit, and rationalized. Black defendants in 2016 face prosecutors who are less
engaged in open discrimination but more likely to be impacted by beliefs and comforted by the
false rationalization of racial tolerance” (Brayer, 2016). Marder (2017) urged the courts to
eliminate peremptory challenges precisely because there does not appear to be a solution to
addressing and correcting for implicit bias. If extended voir dire does not correct for implicit
bias and attitudes continue to be a proxy for race, eliminating peremptory challenges is worth
considering.
Limitations and Future Research
Because participants were not affected by race, I was unable to test if accountability
reduces bias in jury selection. Accountability has been successful in reducing discrimination in
employment settings and the criminal justice system is employing type of accountability both in
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district attorneys’ offices and through legislation. A small number of district attorney offices are
beginning to implement conviction review units. The Brooklyn district attorney’s office
implemented the largest Conviction Review Unit in the country in 2014
(http://brooklynda.org/conviction-review-unit). Furthermore, the New York State Senate
recently passed a bill (S2412D) to create a Commission on Prosecutorial Misconduct. These
steps could create avenues that make prosecutors accountable.
Another limitation could have been using both law students and prosecutors as
participants. Ideally, the participant pool would consist of current or former prosecutors who
have had trial and voir dire experience. However, there is no guarantee that prosecutors would
behave similarly in a study and an actual voir dire. Real cases have stakes that are difficult to
replicate. Prosecutors receive pressure from victims’ families, the government, the police, and
their bosses to secure a conviction. Although we attempted to incentivize participants with a
monetary bonus, it still pales in comparison to the consequences prosecutors encounter during
jury selection and a trial.
Conclusion
Although in the present research, participants did not make racially motivated decisions,
this should not be interpreted as if prosecutors do not consider race during jury selection. Just
recently an amicus brief was filed in Muscogee County, Georgia in which 27 out of 27 Black
jurors were struck by the prosecution in five death penalty cases in the 1970s (Georgia v. Gates,
1977). Notably, one of the prosecutors was Douglas Pullen who was also a member of the
prosecution in Foster v. Chatman (2016). Perhaps more importantly, racially motivated
decision-making still affects jury selection and trials. In Houston County, Alabama from 2005 to
2009, prosecutors have used peremptory strikes to remove 80% of black venirepersons in cases
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where the death penalty has been imposed. As a result, nearly half of the juries were all-white
and the remaining juries had only one black juror despite the fact that Houston County is 27%
African-American (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010).
Furthermore, even when a Batson challenge is raised, the courts continue to accept
ridiculous “race neutral” reasons. As recent as 2004, a Louisiana court allowed a prosecutor to
strike a black juror whom he thought “looked like a drug dealer”(State v. Crawford, 2004).
Although it is possible that current laboratory studies are unable to capture what archival data
demonstrates, decisions like Crawford continue with alarming regularity. Therefore, it is
imperative that other methodologies are implemented to continue to explore reducing bias in jury
selection.
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Table 1.
Participant experience conducting voir dires
1
2-10
11-20
21-30
31 or more
Only mock voir dires
Total

ƒ

Percent

Cumulative Percent

12
36
13
7
50
122
240

5.0
15.0
5.4
2.9
20.8
50.8
100

5.0
20.0
25.4
28.3
49.2
100.0
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Table 2.
Participant race
White/Caucasian
Black/African-American
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Total

N

Percent

173
20
23
14
9
239

72.1
8.3
9.6
5.8
3.8
100

Note. One participant chose not to respond
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Table 3
Results of models
H1
Est.
(SE)

H1a
(Black)
Est.
(SE)

H1b
(White)
Est.
(SE)

3.73**
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.05)

3.72**
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.07)

3.74**
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.06)

-0.002
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.09)
0.06
(0.09)

0.01
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.78)

2.59**
(0.07)
-4.08**
(0.10)
0.01
(0.04)

2.54**
(0.09)
-4.00**
(0.12)

2.59**
(0.08)
-4.15**
(0.11)

0.09
(0.12)
-0.15
(0.12)

0.16
(0.17)
-0.31
(0.17)

-0.04
(0.15)
0.02
(0.51)

Fixed components
Intercept
Accountability (L2)
Instructions (L2)
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Overrule-Uphold
None-Overrule
Attitude (L1)
Defense-Ambiguous
Prosecution-Defense
Race (L1)
Accountability x instructions
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule]

accountability x attitude
accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous]
accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense]

-0.18
(0.14)
0.35
(0.20)

-0.22
(0.18)
0.34
(0.230

-0.20
(0.02)
0.36
(0.21)

0.12
(0.17)
0.05
(0.17)
-0.47
(0.24)
0.003
(0.24)
0.03
(0.09)

0.02
(0.22)
0.12
(0.23)
-0.42
(0.28)
-0.07
(0.28)

0.16
(0.20)
-0.02
(0.20)
-0.49
(0.26)
0.06
(0.26)

-0.67
(0.50)

-0.58
(0.41)

instructions x attitude
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous]
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous]
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense]
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense]
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accountability [Yes-No] x race [W-B]
instructions x race
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x race [W-B]
instructions [None-Overrule] x race [W-B]

0.06
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.11)

attitude x race
attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]
attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]

0.02
(0.11)
-0.15
(0.10)

accountability x instructions x attitude
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous]

-0.53
(0.33)

accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense]

0.04
(0.33)
0.41
(0.48)
0.29
(0.49)

accountability x instructions x race
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x race [W-B]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x race [W-B]

-0.15
(0.21)
0.29
(0.21)

accountability x attitude x race
accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]
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accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]

0.06
(0.21)
0.03
(0.19)

instructions x attitude x race
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]

0.16
(0.26)
-0.16
(0.27)
-0.07
(0.24)
0.15
(0.24)

accountability x instructions x attitude x race
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x
attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x
attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B]

0.09
(0.53)
-0.03
(0.53)

0.03
(0.45)
0.70
(0.56)
0.25
(0.57)

0.03
(0.41)
0.18
(0.52)
0.35
(0.50)

accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x
attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x
attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B]
Random components

-0.48
(0.48)
0.09
(0.48)

𝜎 2Residual

0.91

0.90

0.25

𝜎 2Intercept

0.26

0.35

0.93

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .001.
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Table 4.
Likelihood to exclude venirepersons
Attitude
Ambiguous

Accountability

Mean (SE)

Mean (SE)

Uphold

No
Yes
No
Yes

3.37 (0.16)
3.22 (0.14)
3.28 (0.14)
3.50 (0.15)

3.46 (0.14)
3.25 (0.13)
3.38 (0.13)
3.47 (0.14)

None

No
Yes

3.48 (0.15)
3.29 (0.15)

3.42 (0.14)
3.39 (0.14)

Uphold

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

5.75 (0.18)
5.81 (0.17)
6.01 (0.17)
5.78 (0.20)
6.32 (0.17)
5.71 (0.19)

5.84 (0.16)
5.84 (0.15)
6.21 (0.14)
5.93 (0.17)
6.22 (0.16)
5.85 (0.15)

No

2.15 (0.17)

1.93 (0.16)

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

2.03 (0.15)
1.65 (0.15)
1.91 (0.17)
1.77 (0.16)
1.90 (0.16)

2.06 (0.15)
1.72 (0.15)
1.74 (0.16)
1.63 (0.16)
1.90 (0.16)

Overrule
None
Prosecution

White

Instructions

Overrule

Defense

Black

Uphold
Overrule
None
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Table 5.
Participants’ final peremptory challenge decisions
Attitude

Gender

Exclusion Count

Ambiguous
Ambiguous
Ambiguous
Ambiguous

Female
Female
Male
Male

6
5
6
7

Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense

Female
Female
Male
Male

101
111
105
118

Prosecution
Prosecution
Prosecution
Prosecution

Female
Female
Male
Male

2
7
3
6
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Table 6.
Justifications for excluding venirepersons
Factor
Race
Race is the reason
Race is not the reason
Gender
Gender is the reason
Gender is not the reason
Occupation
Pro-defense
Social worker
Union organizer
Midwife
Yoga instructor
Pro-prosecution
Car salesman
Urologist
Petroleum geologist
Farmer
Ambiguous
Pilot
Plumber
Pawnbroker
Motel Owner
Attitudes
Pro-defense
Does not believe in circumstantial evidence
Anti-police/mistrust of criminal justice system
Concerns about wrongful conviction
Positive attitude towards Black causes
Nullification
Pro-prosecution
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ƒ
5
4
1
0
0
0
25
20
15
7
2
9
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
222
214
85
122
50
1
25
7

Appendix A: Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983)
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

61

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Appendix B: Venireperson Profiles
Juror 1
Social Worker
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

X

63

Very strongly
agree

Juror 2
Car Salesman
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

x

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X
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6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

65

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 3
Pilot
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

66

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

67

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 4
Urologist
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X
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6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

69

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 5
Plumber
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

71

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 6
Union Organizer
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

73

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 7
Pawnbroker
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X
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Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

75

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 8
Petroleum Geologist
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

x

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X
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6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

77

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 9
Midwife
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

X

79

Very strongly
agree

Juror 10
Yoga Instructor
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

80

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X
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Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 11
Stockbroker
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

X
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Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

x

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

x

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Juror 12
Business owner
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following:
1. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

2. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

3. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

4. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime for which they are
charged.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

5. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

6. In most cases where the accused person presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

7. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

8. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X

9. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

X

10. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted.
Very strongly
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

X
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Agree

Strongly agree

Very strongly
agree

Appendix C: Recruitment Email
Hello,
My name is Karima Modjadidi and I am a doctoral candidate at the John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, in New York City. I am conducting an online study on jury selection under the
supervision of Dr. Margaret Bull Kovera. We are recruiting prosecutors and law students from
all over the country. In order to qualify as a law student, you must have participated in a mock
voir dire, taken a course or seminar about jury selection and /litigation. I was wondering if you
and/or your office would be willing to participate in our study.
Results of this study will be disseminated in peer reviewed psycholegal journals, such as Law
and Human Behavior, and results will be published as aggregate data; attorneys’ names will
never be linked to their data. This project is funded by the American Psychology-Law Society
and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.
The study takes approximately 30 minutes to complete and guarantees $35 and potential for
$50 (through PayPal or Venmo). Participants will be asked to read a short trial summary and
potential juror profiles, and then asked to answer some brief questions about the potential jurors.
Interested parties can contact the researcher for this study, Karima Modjadidi,
at kmodjadidi@jjay.cuny.edu. For more information on Dr. Kovera, you can visit her website
at: http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~mkovera/.
Survey responses will be entirely anonymous. For your convenience the study can be
accessed online at https://gccunyep.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6Rx3ducEwMPfB

9r
Finally, if you know other prosecutors or law students who may be interested in
participating please feel free to forward them this letter or survey link. If you have any
questions about this research, please feel free to contact me at kmodjadidi@jjay.cuny.edu.
I appreciate your assistance and would like to thank you in advance for your participation.
Sincerely,
Karima Modjadidi, MA
Doctoral Candidate
John Jay College
The Graduate Center, CUNY
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Appendix D: Participant Instructions
You will be playing the role of a prosecuting attorney conducting a jury selection for an
armed burglary case. You will first read a case summary and then be presented with
information about twelve potential jurors on your panel. Please rate how likely it is that
you would use a peremptory challenge on each potential juror. At the end you will be
able to use two peremptory challenges. Please select two jurors that you would like to
excuse from the jury.
YOU ARE ELIGIBLE FOR A $15 BONUS IF YOUR FINAL SELECTION MATCHES
THE TWO POTENTIAL JURORS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RATED BY
ATTORNEYS AS THE LEAST FAVORABLE TO THEIR CASE.
Below is a summary of the case:
Trial Number: 98210-12-100
Location:
San Antonio, Texas
Charge:
One Count of Battery with Serious Bodily Injury
Defendant:
André Barkley, 6’0”, 175 lbs., African-American male, 25 years-old
Alleged Victim: Matthew Clinton, 6’2”, 185 lbs., Caucasian male, 45 years old
Prosecution
The prosecution claims that on the night of September 14, 2016, the defendant,
André Barkley broke into the home of Matthew Clinton at approximately 10:00PM. Mr.
Clinton came down the stairs into the dark living room and confronted Mr. Barkley
threatening to call 911. Mr. Barkley grabbed a nearby lamp and repeatedly hit the victim
with it. The victim suffered a concussion, a broken eye socket, 4 broken ribs, 3 broken
fingers, and several other cuts and bruises.
Although Mr. Clinton could not identify the defendant, the police investigation
revealed several hairs near the crime scene matching Mr. Barkley. Additionally, two
blood drops containing DNA matching Mr. Barkley were collected on the living room
rug. The prosecution claims the defendant cut himself on the broken glass resulting from
using the lamp to beat Mr. Clinton.
Defense
The defense claims that because there was no positive identification it is possible
that someone else was the attacker. The defense questions the validity of the DNA
results.
PLEASE INDICATE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT YOU WOULD USE YOUR
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE FOLLOWING POTENIAL JURORS.
REMEMBER THAT YOU ARE PROSECUTING THE CASE.
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Appendix E: Consent

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Psychology
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study:

Attorney Decision-Making Study

Principal Investigator:

Dr. Margaret Kovera
Professor of Psychology

You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are a practicing attorney or
law student.
Purpose:
The purpose of this research study is to examine how attorneys make decisions during voir dire.
We cannot tell you every detail of this study ahead of time, but if you are willing to p
articipate
under these conditions, we will explain the procedure to you fully after your participatio
n.

Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
•
•
•
•

Read a summary of case facts
Read descriptions of potential jurors
Make decisions about potential jurors
You will be one of 280 participants in this study

Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 30 minutes.
Potential Risks or Discomforts:
The foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study are minimal, but if you feel
uncomfortable answering a question you can skip it and proceed to the next question
Potential Benefits:
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•

This study benefits society by providing information about how current and future
attorneys make decisions.

Payment for Participation:
You will receive $35.00 for your participation with a possibility of receiving an additional $15.
You will need a PayPal or Venmo account to receive payment. Your answers will not be linked
to your account. At the end of the study you will be asked for payment information.
New Information:
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your
willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality:
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only with
your permission or as required by law.
We will not collect any identifying information during the course of this study. Any information
obtained in connection with this study will be strictly confidential. In any written reports or
publications, no one will be identified or identifiable and only aggregate data will be presented.
Research records will be kept on a password protected computer; only the researchers will have
access to the records. Your PayPal or Venmo ID number will be stored separately from your
responses to the questions that you will be asked.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of
research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information
about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by
name.
Participants’ Rights:
•

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled.

•

You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any
time, without any penalty.

Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the
following researchers:

89

Karima Modjadidi
Doctoral Candidate
kmodjadidi@jjay.cuny.edu
Margaret Bull Kovera
Professor of Psychology
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Electronic Consent:
Clicking on the “AGREE” button below indicates:
-You have read the above information
-You voluntarily agree to participate in this study
-You are at least 18 years of age

If you do not wish to participate in the study, please decline participation by clicking on the
“DISAGREE” button.
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Appendix F: Executed Latin Square
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Appendix G: Coding Scheme for Justifications
A RaceA1
Race is the reason I excluded
A2
Race is NOT the reason I excluded
B gender
B1
gender is the reason I excluded
B2
gender is NOT the reason I excluded
C occupation
C1
pro-defense occupation noted
C1.1 Social worker
C1.2 Union Organizer
C1.3 Midwife
C1.4 Yoga instructor
C2
pro-prosecution occupation noted
C2.1 Car Salesman
C2.2 Urologist
C2.3 Petroleum Geologist
C2.4 Farmer
C3
ambiguous occupation noted
C3.1 Pilot
C3.2 Plumber
C3.3 Pawnbroker
C3.4 Motel Owner
D. Attitudes/answers to the questions asked
D1
pro-defense
D1.1 doesn’t believe in circumstantial evidence
D1.2 anti-police/mistrust of CJ system
D1.3 concerns about wrongful conviction
D1.4 positive attitude towards blacks or causes supporting them (BLM)
D1.5 they are nullifiers/won’t follow the law
D2
Pro-prosecution
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